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The Belfast Agreement and the Nation
that "Always Arrives at Its Destination"
Barry Collins*
The legal institutions established by the 1998 Belfast
Agreement are notable for the success with which they have come
to embody legal authority in a society that has been bitterly divided
by over thirty years of conflict. This does not mean, however, that
the Agreement has come to be regarded as a final settlement of the
dispute. Indeed, the way in which the Agreement has appeared to
claim authority has been through the establishment of legal and
administrative institutions which have the capacity to be accepted
by the majority of both Irish nationalists and Ulster unionists, but
which do not appear to foreclose the broader "national" question.
The general ambit of this article is to investigate "where the nation
has gone" in relation to this new administrative discourse that
characterises the Belfast Agreement.1 On the one hand, this new
administrative discourse appears to suspend the national question
from the legal sphere; on the other, as this article will examine, the
"neutral" administrative discourse that has been instituted by the
Belfast Agreement only seems to acquire authority insofar as this
administrative discourse is seen by the legal subject as in some way
"belonging" to them in particular. What this process shows is the
way in which the administrative discourse of the Belfast Agreement
acquires authority for the subject insofar as it can "stand in" for the
nation. Naturally, this raises interesting questions about the
relationship between legal discourse and the nation. In particular,
it raises questions about how the Belfast Agreement has re-ordered
* Lecturer, School of Law, University of East London, United Kingdom
<b.collins@uel.ac.uk> Particular thanks are due to Beverley Brown, Prof. Peter
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1. Agreement Reached in Multi-Party Negotiations, Dublin, Belfast, London,
1998 [hereinafter the Belfast Agreement], also known as the Good Friday
Agreement.
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the way in which the legal subject is ideologically constituted: both
as the addressee of "the nation" and through the subject's self-
identification in legal discourse.
This article will explore the ideological operation of "the
nation" in relation to the Belfast Agreement by drawing on more
general debates about the relationship between legal discourse and
authority. One mode of describing this relationship that has
particular currency in contemporary legal scholarship is to treat the
nation in terms of the way in which its invocation (or
presupposition) by legal discourse attempts to "ground" legal
authority by providing law with a foundational origin. What is
revealed in any such "search" for national origins is, of course, that
the origin turns out not to exist, and that its presupposition by legal
discourse is simply that: a presupposition. While accepting the
impossibility of the nation as a foundation for legal authority, this
article will also elaborate a methodology that describes the way in
which the nation constitutes political and legal identification. This
involves a shift from a concern with the nation as an origin that can
never be coherently constituted by legal discourse to a concern with
the way in which the operation of the nation as a signifier re-orders
the subject's identification of itself as the addressee of legal
discourse. Drawing on Jacques Lacan's Seminar on the Purloined
Letter,2 this article will describe this methodological shift in terms of
a shift from seeing the nation as an origin that never "arrives" in
legal discourse to an understanding of the nation as a letter that
''always arrives at its destination."
I. Legal Discourse and the Problem of Legal Authority.
First, however, it is necessary to rehearse the familiar juridical
and logical paradox that is ubiquitous not only in positivist accounts
of the social contract, but which much contemporary legal theory
presents as being constitutive of the legal order. This familiar
paradox is nothing less than the problem that in order for the state
to declare its authority, it must always already presuppose the pre-
existence of that authority.
Derrida, for example, in his analysis of the United States
Declaration of Independence, describes this paradox in terms of the
ontological status that is given to "the people" as a foundation of
legal authority in the United States Declaration of Independence.
2. Jacques Lacan, Seminar on "The Purloined Letter" (Jeffrey Mehiman
trans.), in THE PURLOINED POE, Ch.2 (John Muller, J. & William Richardson,
eds., 1988).
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Observing the way in which legal discourse seeks to perpetually
defer the origin back into the past, he notes, "this people does not
exist. They do not exist as an entity, it does not exist, before the
declaration, not as such. If it gives birth to itself, as free and
independent subject, as possible signer, this can hold only in the act
of signature. The signature invents the signer... the Declaration
remains the producer and guarantor of its own signature.. .The
people," the "founders" of law have to be constituted as the
foundation of law retroactively: they must be presupposed to exist
in order to "bring the law to the light of day."'
Derrida's response to this paradox is to reveal the way in which
legal discourse fails to coherently "ground" its own authority
through the presupposition of a fictional origin. What is concealed
by this "fabulous retroactivity"5 is the performative force of the
declarative act, and consequently, the impossibility of "the people"
as a coherent foundation of legal authority.
The way in which legal authority is presupposed by legal
discourse is nicely illustrated by an example given (in a different
context) by Slavoj Zizek. Drawing on Searle's taxonomy of speech
acts, Zizek examines the force of the declaration: "the meeting is
now closed." This statement produces a performative effect (it
closes the meeting) by the utterance of an otherwise constative
statement (it describes a meeting which is already closed). The
statement becomes true as a description of things through its own
performative force (the statement closes the meeting). The speaker
changes the world by "representing it as having been so changed."6
Although Zizek's and Derrida's broader methodological concerns
differ considerably, both accounts illustrate the performativity of
legal discourse. This is insofar as they both reveal the "trick" by
which legal authority is constituted by legal discourse: legal
discourse appears to embody legal authority by describing legal
authority as always having already been embodied: as always
already there.
A concern with this paradoxical presupposition of legal
authority is, of course, not peculiar to these contemporary theorists.
Indeed, Hans Kelsen, in his "General Theory of Law," endeavours
to transcend this problem of legal authority by relying on the
3. See Jacques Derrida, Declarations of Independence, 15 NEW POLl. SCI. 7,
10 (1986).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See SLAVOJ ZIZEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY Do 97 (1992); and
JOHN SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY 172 (1979).
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concept of the grundnorm, a concept which, at various points in his
writings, he calls a "hypothesis," a "presupposition" and finally a
"fiction."7 The grundnorm operates as the originary principle of a
legal system, as a basic norm that allows for laws to be interpreted
as valid, and to enable law to be distinguished from non-law.
However, the grundnorm, which is essential to every act of legal
interpretation," cannot escape the paradox that underpins its own
authority. As Kelsen says, "the basic norm is not created in a legal
procedure by a law-creating organ. It is not-as a positive legal
norm is-valid because it is created in a certain way, but it is valid
because it is presupposed to be valid."9 Davies observes that the
grundnorm is chronologically before the law (it is posited as the
"origin" of the legal order), but it can only come into existence
through its recognition in the legal system of which it is an origin.
In this sense, it is paradoxically both prior to the law and
subsequent to it.10
In relation to a reading of the Belfast Agreement, an obvious
question poses itself: How does the nation fit into this logico-
juridical paradox of legal authority? Typically, in much contem-
porary legal theory, it is subsumed as an instance of the more
general problematic; as yet another mechanism by which legal
discourse has sought to foreclose this troubling paradox which lies
at the heart of legal authority. It fits this mode of critique insofar as
constitutional discourse seeks to invoke the nation as an
"originary" transcendent principle to guarantee the authority of
law." To this extent, the invocation of the nation (like "the people"
in Derrida's account) as an origin of legal authority does not avoid
the same paradox upon which legal authority is founded. On the
7. See MARGARET DAVIES, DELIMITING THE LAW: 'POSTMODERNISM' AND
THE POLITICS OF LAW 82 (1996); and HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF NORMS
256, n.2 (1991).
8. Margaret Davies, for example, describes the grundnorm as the "most legal
thing." See DAVIES, supra note 7, at 81.
9. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 116 (1945).
10. See DAVIES, supra note 7.
11. See PETER FITZPATRICK, MODERNISHM AND THE GROUNDS OF LAW Ch.4
(2001). The nation can also be understood in this instance in terms of what Peter
Goodrich might call an "ideational source of law". Goodrich describes this as a
principle that seeks to "ground" the legal order by providing it with an "external
and absolute justification for legal regulation, discipline and law". Goodrich
describes the function of this "ideational" source of law as twofold: to give law its
conceptual unity, and to distinguish law from non-legal discourse. Goodrich
demonstrates, however, that the ideational source fails to give law its systemic
unity because it must appeal to external, non-legal sources for its justification. See
also PETER GOODRICH, READING THE LAW Ch.1 (1986).
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one hand, the constitutional discourse must be the embodiment of
the nation: In order to claim legal authority it must invoke the
authority of the nation as the entity from which legal authority is
derived. On the other hand, the constitution must itself bring the
nation into existence by constituting (or embodying) the nation;
thereby authorising the nation as a source of law. In short,
constitutional discourse must presuppose that the nation already
exists in order for the nation to be "produced" as an origin for legal
discourse.
The significance of this reading of the nation is particularly
evident in relation to post-colonial constitutional settlements,
because the invocation of the nation in constitutional discourse
allows for the new legal order to be distinguished from what has
gone before. The constitutional declaration of nationhood gives the
post-colonial order the stamp of authority by re-stating the
boundary between the legal and the non-legal by reference to the
nation. The post-colonial legal order more often than not claims
legal authority as the embodiment of the nation with a legitimacy
that the colonial order could never match. This value of this order
of critique for post-colonial legal scholars lies in the way in which it
reveals the fictional, paradoxical and exclusive character of the
unitary nation that is ubiquitously invoked as the foundation of
post-colonial legal order. Deconstruction opens up the question of
the coherency with which the new state marks out its distinctiveness
from the existing colonial order. A deconstructivist methodology
reveals the way in which the act of constituting the nation in legal
discourse is also an act of excluding those counter-discourses that
challenge the nation's unitary character.'2  By revealing the
impossibility around which the "new" foundation of law is
organised, it becomes possible to explore the way in which post-
colonial discourse operates as a mimicry of the colonial legal order,
a mimicry in which the social hierarchies and institutional sources
of law of the colonial order have largely been kept in place. This
sense of the impossibility which constitutes the post-colonial state is
nicely articulated by Sdamus Deane's description of the post-
independence Irish Free State: "the fake nation, with its inflated
rhetoric of origin and authenticity, had given way to the fake state,
with its deflated rhetoric of bureaucratic dinginess. In the passage
from the fantasy of one to the realism of the other, the entity called
12. See Roshan De Silva, An Ontological Approach to Constitutionalism in Sri
Lanka: Contingency and the Failure of Exclusion," in LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL
181-203 (Eve Darian-Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick, eds. 1999).
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Ireland had failed to appear."'3 Indeed, this failure of the nation to
"arrive" neatly summarises the deconstructivist concern with
revealing the failure of the nation as a point of origin. As Patrick
Hanafin notes, "The Constitution is an attempt to pass from the
imagined sense of Irishness to the realised state of Ireland. The
writing of the nation cannot found the nation, the nation is, to
paraphrase Derrida, always in the future (avenir), always to come
(a venir)."'4 A declaration of independence, or a constitutional
document declares itself to be the embodiment of the nation, but
only insofar as the nation itself has been retroactively constituted
by the act of declaration. It is in this sense that nation is an
impossible entity: an entity whose embodiment cannot be
produced by constitutional discourse.
However, this focus on the retroactive presupposition of
origins in legal discourse also permits another conceptualisation of
the way in which the nation is constituted as law's origin, one that I
would suggest has not sufficiently been taken up by legal
scholarship. That approach is one that accepts that the origins of
law (as well as the subject of law) are irredeemably split. This is
because the nation is constituted by an attempt to close the gap
between the presumption that legal authority should be grounded
in legal discourse and the fact that the origin of legal authority must
be located outside of law. It is the split between these two that
renders the closure of legal discourse impossible, and that makes
the boundary between the legal and the extra-legal impossible to
sustain. What this article will suggest is that the operation of the
nation in relation to legal discourse can also be seen in terms of the
way in which the nation makes an impossible and recurring attempt
to plug this cognitive gap. In Lacanian terms, this might mean
describing the nation in terms of the objet a, which is installed for
the subject, albeit momentarily, as the thing that closes the "hole"
in the chain of signification. This is an approach that places an
emphasis on the way in which political subjectivity is constituted by
the ideological address of the nation, rather than one which merely
reveals the "failure" of legal discourse to secure the systemic
coherency of law though the invocation of origins, or one which
demonstrates how the nation always fails to "arrive" in legal
discourse.
13. See SEAMUS DEANE, STRANGE COUNTRY 162 (1997).
14. See PATRICK HANAFIN, CONSTITUTING IDENTITY: POLITICAL IDENTITY
FORMATION AND THE CONSTITUTION IN POST-INDEPENDENCE IRELAND 24 (2001).
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As this article has recounted, critical legal theorists have
revealed the impossibility of a legal foundation from which legal
authority can be derived as a matter of logical inference. However,
in the "revelation" that legal discourse is founded on an
impossibility, on a paradoxical fiction of origins, an unwitting
methodological presumption is often made. That presumption is
that the problem of origins is not just a logical problem of the
contradiction involved in the declaration of legal authority, but that
the origin that legal discourse has actually invoked is the wrong
one! The deconstructivist analysis of the relationship between law
and the origin merely reveals that each time one tries to locate the
origin in relation to a legal text (as I have done above in relation to
the Belfast Agreement), it is never there: it cannot signify what it
claims to signify; it lacks the content that it needs to have in order
to constitute a coherent origin. In this sense, deconstructivism can
itself become a means of "framing" the relationship between legal
discourse and nation: as a circuit of inauthenticity, as the non-
arrival of the nation in legal discourse. Ironically, this hysterical
loop echoes the naive frustration of the nationalist who keeps
looking for the "true" embodiment of the nation in legal discourse,
but is always disappointed to find that it's never as "true" as it
seems!
What this article seeks to articulate is a methodology that can
be employed in understanding the relationship between the legal
discourse of the Belfast Agreement and nation, but which is
concerned (in an attempt to break the hysterical loop) with the
operation of the fiction of origins rather than with its content or
lack thereof. In terms of the Belfast Agreement, it will mean a
consideration of the ideological operation of the nation as a
signifier in relation to legal discourse, irrespective of what it is that
the nation might signify, or, more importantly, fail to signify. To do
this, I want to shift methodological emphasis: from the nation as a
fictional entity that must always fail to materialise to the nation as a
point of identification which only has significance insofar as it
materialises for the subject. In short, this shift of emphasis is from
the nation that fails to arrive in legal discourse to the nation that
always arrives at its destination!
II. The "Missing Origins of the Belfast Agreement"
However, it is first worth exploring some of the particular
issues that arise in relation to the question of origins in the Belfast
Agreement. In particular, it is never clear in the Belfast Agreement
2002]
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which origin, or which nation is being claimed as the legitimating
authority of the new legal institutions in Northern Ireland. Indeed,
it is clear from any cursory examination of the Belfast Agreement
that its legal institutions rely for the foundation of their legitimacy
on entirely contradictory accounts of national origins. Unlike most
constitutional documents (which make a claim to authority by
invoking the nation as an origin), the Belfast Agreement appears to
do the reverse, as its legitimacy rests on the extent to which it can
appear to suspend the question of which nation is embodied by its
institutions.
One approach to the question of origins might be to suggest
that the Belfast Agreement does not embody a new legal order,
because power has merely been devolved to Northern Ireland by a
Westminster statute" which delegates legislative power from
Westminster on a range of matters to the Northern Ireland
Assembly, in the same way that power might be delegated to, for
instance a local authority. The statute contains the provisions
which confer power on a range of new legal institutions: an elected
Northern Ireland Assembly, an Executive and a number of other
legal institutions, most notably, the North/South Ministerial
Council, the British-Irish Council, the British-Irish Intergovern-
mental Conference and the Northern Ireland Human Rights
Commission. However, the institutions do not derive their
authority entirely from Westminster. The statute merely imple-
ments the Belfast Agreement, an agreement which was signed by
both the British and Irish governments after multi-party
negotiations with all of the major political parties in the Northern
Irish conflict. The Belfast Agreement was approved by
simultaneous referenda in both Northern Ireland and the Irish
Republic. This fact problematises any attempt to locate the legal
authority of the Northern Irish legal institutions in "the will of the
people," because the question of which "people" one is talking
about is never clear. The inclusivist nature of the Agreement
means that for Irish nationalists (who do not recognise the
legitimacy of Northern Ireland as a political entity), the legal
authority of the Belfast Agreement is derived from the will of the
people of Ireland as a whole. This has significance for Irish
nationalists because it is the first all-Ireland poll since the 1918
general election. An additional source of legal authority of the
Northern Ireland institutions, from an Irish nationalist perspective
is derived from the amendment that the Irish Republic made by
15. Northern Ireland Act 1998 (UK).
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referendum to its 1937 Constitution. This amendment, which was
introduced as part of the Belfast Agreement, renounced the Irish
constitutional claim over Northern Ireland, bound the state to the
provisions of the Belfast Agreement and gave constitutional
recognition to the institutions established under the Agreement.
By contrast, for Ulster unionists, who do not recognise the
legitimacy of a role for the Dublin government in Northern Irish
affairs, legal authority for the new institutions is derived entirely
from the vote that took place in Northern Ireland alone. If one
looks (even in the most positivist terms) for the origin of legal
authority of the new Northern Irish legal institutions, one will be
faced with the simple answer: the location of the origin of legal
authority in the Belfast Agreement depends entirely on the position
from which one seeks to locate it.
The same difficulty is encountered in attempts to locate the
origins of the new legal institutions in any appeal to national
identity that might be made by the new legal institutions of
Northern Ireland. As the new Northern Ireland institutions have
no written constitution, one must search the foundational
documents of the institutions (the Belfast Agreement, the Northern
Ireland Act, etc.) for any appeal that they might make to any
particular myth of national origins. What one finds is that these
documents are remarkably prosaic, concerned primarily with the
establishment of administrative institutions, and scrupulously
avoiding any statement that could appear to give the institutions the
status of embodying one nation rather than another. The Belfast
Agreement, for example, eschews the language of nationhood, and
speaks instead of a "commitment to partnership, equality and
mutual respect as the basis of relationships within Northern Ireland,
between North and South and between these Islands."' 6 Indeed,
the only place in any of the foundational legal documents of the
new Northern Ireland legal institutions where the idea of the nation
is re-stated is in the nineteenth amendment to the 1937 Constitution
of Ireland, which was inserted in 1998 under the auspices of the
Belfast Agreement). This amendment defines the nation in the
most inclusive of terms, describing national identity not in cultural
or indeed mythical terms, but (almost echoing the language of
consumer rights) as an "entitlement" of "every person born in the
island of Ireland."' 17
16. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, § 1.2 (Declaration of support).
17. See Arts. 2 and 3, Constitution of Ireland, 1937. The nineteenth
amendment amended Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution. The amended
2002]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
Indeed, what is notable about the Belfast Agreement is the
sense in which the "national question," the question of exactly
which nation the legal institutions are meant to embody is
repeatedly deferred by the legal text (although unlike other
constitutional texts, it does not defer the appeal to origins into the
past). In pragmatic terms, of course, this is the condition of the
whole agreement; that both nationalists and unionists should
partially give up on the demand to have their national claims
realised. In exchange for this partial loss, the Belfast Agreement
offers legal institutions that can (in theory, at least) function
without their "national" status being resolved. That is to say that
Irish nationalists can see the institutions as having an all-Ireland
dimension, while Ulster unionists can see them as guaranteeing a
unionist veto over a future United Ireland. In the place of grand
constitutional declarations about nationhood, the Belfast Agree-
ment has substituted the bureaucratic detail of administrative
discourse: a range of administrative institutions to "fill in" the
absence of a narrative of national origins. Where the Belfast
Agreement does address the question of national identity, it does so
by attempting to nullify its disruptive, or indeed foundational force.
The agreement recognises, for example that legal sovereignty is not
co-extensive with nationality by recognising the "birthright of all
the people in Northern Ireland to identify themselves as Irish, or
British, or both. '' "8 The pledge of office for Assembly members, for
example, contains no oath of allegiance, but is couched in terms of a
commitment to non-violence, non-discrimination and bureaucratic
responsibility."9 In this sense, the Belfast Agreement can be seen as
articles read as follows: Art 2: "It is the entitlement and birthright of every person
born in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the
Irish nation. That is also the entitlement of all persons otherwise qualified in
accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish nation
cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share
its cultural identity and heritage." Art 3: "It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in
harmony and friendship, to unite all the people who share the territory of the
island of Ireland, in all the diversity of their identities and traditions, recognising
that a united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the
consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions
in the island. Until then, the laws enacted by the Parliament established by this
Constitution shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws enacted
by the Parliament that existed immediately before the coming into operation of
this Constitution."
18. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, § 2.1(vi) (Constitutional Issues).
19. Id. § 3, Annex A (Draft Clauses/Schedules for Incorporation in British
Legislation). The full pledge reads:
(a) to discharge in good faith all the duties of office; (b) commitment to
non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means; (c) to serve
[Vol. 20:2
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an attempt to substitute administrative detail for the "grand"
language of nationhood, what one could describe as the language of
the long game." However, it should be noted that during the multi-
party negotiations that produced the Belfast Agreement, a great
deal of the public debate on the Belfast Agreement was organised
not so much around the administrative details of the Agreement,
but, by contrast, around questions of the "long game:" the question
of whether the Belfast Agreement was the first step towards a
United Ireland or whether it was a surrender by the IRA to an
acceptance of the partition of Ireland .
However, there are many traces of "long game" discourse to
be found in the Belfast Agreement. that address, albeit in a
tangential way, the relation between legal authority and the
"national question." In the section of the Agreement that deals
with "Constitutional Issues" the Agreement recognises the
"legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of
the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether
they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or
a sovereign united Ireland.' From an Irish nationalist point of
view, this invocation of the will of the people is highly problematic,
because it carries within it a recognition of the legal validity of
Northern Ireland. However, this clause is tempered by the
subsequent one, which recognises "that it is for the people of the
island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts
respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their
right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and
concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united
Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be
achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and
all the people of Northern Ireland equally, and to act in accordance with
the general obligations on government to promote equality and prevent
discrimination; (d) to participate with colleagues in the preparation of a
programme for government; (e) to operate within the framework of that
programme when agreed within the Executive Committee and endorsed
by the Assembly; (f) to support, and to act in accordance with, all
decisions of the Executive Committee and Assembly; (g) to comply with
the Ministerial Code of Conduct.
Id.
20. See CAIN, Conflict Archive on the Internet: CAIN Web Service, at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2002).
21. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, § 2.1(i) (Constitutional Issues). Both this
section and §.2.1(ii) also appear in Article 1 of the Agreement between the
Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of
Ireland Establishing a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (1998). They
are also given effect by the Northern Ireland Act 1998, § 1 (UK).
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consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. 22 This
declaration has the effect of partly nullifying the invocation of
popular will in the previous subsection by recognising the right of
the Irish people to abolish the legal institutions of the Belfast
Agreement, as long as this is done with the consent of the majority
in Northern Ireland. This aspect of the Agreement, often referred
to as the "principle of consent," is given particular emphasis by pro-
Agreement unionist political discourse insofar as it appears to
guarantee the status quo of Northern Ireland as a pat of the United
Kingdom. This, however, does not negate one of the extraordinary
features of the Belfast Agreement: that it expressly envisages the
conditions of its own abolition as a legal authority. The Belfast
Agreement provides, for example that the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland must order the holding of a poll to decide the
constitutional status of Northern Ireland "if at any time it appears
to him likely that a majority of those voting would express a wish
that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United
Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland."" In the section of the
Belfast Agreement that deals with human rights, one of the rights
specifically guaranteed is the "right to pursue democratically
national and political aspirations" and the "right to seek
constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate means."24
Taken together, these provisions, as well as the recognition of
the right to "pursue national aspirations" go well beyond the self-
limitation that one normally finds in constitutional documents.
Instead, they give the impression of a declaration of legal authority
that carries within it a sense of its own temporary nature, a sense
that the "national question can be deferred," but perhaps not
indefinitely. This is also reflected in the recognition that the will of
the majority in Northern Ireland to remain part of the United
Kingdom is not a timeless, transcendental entity, but merely "the
present wish of [the] majority."' It could be argued that unlike the
eternal temporality in which most constitutional declarations of
legal authority are framed, the discourse of the Belfast Agreement
22. Id. § 2.1(ii) (Constitutional Issues).
23. Id. § 2, annex A, schedule 1, s.2 (Draft Clauses/Schedules for
Incorporation into British Legislation).
24. Id. § 6.1 (Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity).
25. Id. § 2.1(iii) (Constitutional Issues). A fuller text of this section reads:
... while a substantial section of the people in Northern Ireland share the
legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the island of Ireland for a
united Ireland, the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern
Ireland, freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union ....
[Vol. 20:2
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operates as though it were a transitional document, establishing a
transitional legal authority. This transitional aspect of the
institutions of the Belfast Agreement is a feature that makes the
Belfast Agreement particularly attractive to Irish nationalists. The
Belfast Agreement ensures that future changes to the sovereignty
of Northern Ireland, such as membership of a united Ireland are
not foreclosed by its legal institutions, subject to the principle of
(unionist) consent. The open potential of the Belfast Agreement is
also reflected in institutions such as the North/South Ministerial
Council, the British Irish Council and the British Irish
Intergovernmental Conference, all of which are established by the
agreement. From an Irish nationalist perspective, the attraction of
these bodies is their potential for development into all-Ireland
administrative structures. The North/South Ministerial Council, for
example, provides for regular meetings between ministers of the
Northern Ireland executive and the Irish government to co-ordinate
policies "in areas where there is a mutual and cross-border
benefit. 2 6 In this context, the Belfast Agreement lays down twelve
subject areas for ministerial co-operation." However, it is
significant that ministerial co-operation is not limited to these
issues, as the Agreement merely states that the areas for North-
South Agreement may include these subject areas, thus allowing for
future areas of co-operation to be developed. The scope of the
British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference is also loosely defined.
The Belfast Agreement provides for regular meetings between the
British and Irish governments both at a ministerial and at summit
(Prime Ministerial/Taoiseach) level to address issues that have not
been devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly. As well as
addressing questions of security, the Conference is to address issues
of security, rights, justice, prisons and policing ".... unless and until
responsibility is devolved to a Northern Ireland administration."
Again in this clause, the potential for constitutional change is left
open. While accepting that the Conference has no power to
"override the democratic arrangements set up by agreement," the
Belfast Agreement envisages a role for the conference in
contributing to "any review of the overall political agreement."
In the suspension of the question of national origins by the
Belfast Agreement, one can see the relevance of Richard Kearney's
26. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, § 2.5(ii) (Constitutional Issues).
27. These subject areas are: agriculture, education, transport, waterways,
social security, tourism, relevant EU programmes, inland fisheries, aquaculture,
health, and urban and rural development. See id. § 4, Annex (North/South
Ministerial Council).
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influential post-nationalist thesis. This thesis argues for the re-
narration of the nation in legal texts, which would "(i) separate the
notion of nation from that of state (ii) acknowledge the co-
existence of different identities in the same society and (iii) extend
models of identification beyond unitary sovereignty to include more
inclusive or pluralist forms of association- such as a British-Irish
Council or a Europe of the regions." ' Undoubtedly, the legal
institutions of the Belfast Agreement make no claim to be a final
resolution of the Irish conflict; they contain no declaration of a
"new" constitutional order, and no direct claim to embody any
particular national "destiny." Instead it is the transitional nature of
these legal institutions that have made them acceptable as a legal
order to nationalists, while it is the guarantee of the principle of
consent that has made them acceptable (although considerably less
so) to unionists. On the other hand, unionists who participate in
the institutions of the Agreement29 demonstrate that they can
accept the transitional potential of the Agreement, as long as it
remains unclear to everybody involved as to what kind of political
entity the Agreement might be a transition towards!
On the face of it, the Belfast Agreement might seem like the
epitome of a post-nationalist (if not post-modern) constitution-
alism, in which the problem of origins and the question of the
relation between state and nation have been neatly sidestepped. In
this process, it appears as if a diffuse legal identity based on notions
of civic political commitment has replaced the idea of a legal
identity based on the nation-state, and on identification with
exclusionary myths of national origin. However, this article will
argue that this is not entirely the case, and that the nation has not
entirely disappeared as an origin of legal discourse. Instead, this
article will suggest that the new "civic" legal identity produced by
the Belfast Agreement must still rely on an identification of legal
institutions as being infused with the nation as the "origin" of legal
discourse, albeit an origin that is installed retrospectively by the
legal subject's identification of itself as the addressee of the nation
through legal discourse. This will involve an alternative way of
reading the relation between legal discourse and the nation, one
that pays particular attention to the way in which subjectivity is re-
ordered by the address of the nation in legal discourse.
28. See RICHARD KEARNEY, POSTNATIONALIST IRELAND 24 (1997).
29. I would include here the participation of the Democratic Unionist Party,
which strongly rejects the Belfast Agreement in principle, but nonetheless
participates in many of its institutions, including the executive.
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This approach is by no means an attempt to restore any notion
of authenticity to the attempt by legal discourse to embody the
authority of the nation, nor is it an attempt to deny the
performative force of legal discourse. Instead, this project seeks to
begin to examine the ways in which the nation "always arrives"
through the subject's self-identification where one least expects it:
in the most prosaic legal institutions of the Belfast Agreement;
administrative legislation; instruments governing the scope of cross-
border bodies; joint ministerial committees, etc. These are aspects
of legal discourse that the critical scholar might be tempted to
overlook as administrative debris, not least because they are
unlikely to directly invoke images of national origins, because they
do not take the form of declaring themselves to embody a founding
moment of legal authority. By contrast, the nineteenth amendment
to Irish constitution is more likely to attract the attention of the
critical theorist, not least because this is a legal development which
directly addresses itself to "grand constitutional" discourse, to the
question of national identity.' However, I would argue that the
transitional administrative arrangements of the Belfast Agreement
also deserve critical attention, for it is in these sublimely prosaic
institutions that the nation "arrives at its destination."
III. Why the Letter "Always Arrives at Its Destination"
The alternative approach to the relationship between the legal
discourse of the Belfast Agreement and the nation that will be
suggested by this article is inspired by Lacan's famous and
enigmatic declaration that "a letter always arrives at its
destination!" In particular, it will be suggested that Lacan's
discussion of the functioning of the signifier in his Seminar on the
Purloined Letter31 offers a helpful analogy for the operation of the
nation in relation to legal discourse.
In order to elaborate this methodology, however, it is first
necessary to take a detour into some of the debates around Edgar
Allan Poe's curious short story, the Purloined Letter.32 The plot of
the Purloined Letter is organised around a series of thefts. The first
theft occurs when the Queen is disturbed in her boudoir by a
surprise visit from the King and his minister. The Queen has been
reading a letter, which she does not wish the King to see; for fear
30. See DECLAN KIBERD, IRISH CLASSICS Ch. 35 (2000).
31. Lacan, supra note 2.
32. See Edgar Allan Poe, The Purloined Letter, in THE PURLOINED POE Ch. 1
(John Muller, J. & William Richardson, eds., 1988).
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that the letter would compromise her. She does not have time to
hide the letter, and in her haste, she leaves it sitting openly on the
table, in the hope that its open display will render it immune from
suspicion. The king, as she had hoped, does not notice the letter.
The minister, however, notices the Queen's lack of composure, and
he notices the letter on the table. Carefully, he substitutes for the
letter a facsimile. The Queen is unable to intervene, for fear of
alerting the King, while the King remains blind to the entire
exchange. What is interesting about the minister's position here is
that he has been enabled to act because he has had the particular
ability to see not only the compromising letter, but also to see the
limitations of those who might seek to impede the theft. However,
this minister, whose all-seeing, hawk-eye glance had enabled him to
steal the letter, does not immediately make use of the power that he
believes the letter to have given him. Its power, after all, lies in its
potential, and the value of the letter will be lost as soon as its
contents become known. The minister himself in turn comes to
delude himself that his possession of the letter is secure, displaying
the coveted letter openly in a letter rack. This time it is the minister
who occupies the position that had previously been occupied by the
Queen, by deluding himself that the letter, so openly displayed, is in
such an obvious place that it could not arouse suspicion. At first,
his instinct seems to be proven correct, as the police, who search the
minister's home to find the letter, fail to see it. This time, it is the
police who see nothing, and in this sense they occupy a position that
had previously been occupied by the King. The Queen, frustrated
by the ineptitude of the police, hires a detective, Dupin, to steal
back the letter. This second thief (Dupin) by a thorough
identification with the first thief (the minister) now comes to
possess the hawk-eye glance of the thief. He sees through the
minister's conceit, identifies the hiding place of the letter and steals
it. However, Dupin cannot resist the temptation to take revenge on
the minister for a previous slight. He substitutes for the stolen
letter a facsimile, upon which he inscribes a couplet in his
distinctive script, from which his identity can be clearly identified.
While this strange story opens up a myriad of interpretative
possibilities, we will concentrate on the way in which the letter
"arrives" for each character. What this means is an examination of
the way in which the various characters identify a position for
themselves in relation to the movement of the letter. It is
important to note that the contents of the letter are never known.
What determines the action of the story is the way in which the
characters become positioned in relation to the letter; how the
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characters identify themselves in relation to the letter. The Queen,
for example, identifies herself as being in a compromising position
as a result of her possession of the letter. Her subsequent lack of
composure, allied to her conceit that the openly displayed letter will
not be noticed by the minister, causes her to lose the letter. The
minister in turn deludes himself that he is made invulnerable by his
possession of the letter, and as a result leaves the letter openly
displayed in the letter rack. Again it is his self-identification (his
identification with an image of himself) that causes him to lose the
letter. Finally, Dupin cannot resist the identification of himself as
the mastermind who has stolen the letter, and he identifies himself
to the minister by leaving his trace, his distinctive handwriting
behind. Dupin in this process also reveals that he is not simply the
mastermind detective he believes himself to be, but that the purity
of his actions is stained by his narcissism and desire for revenge.
Perhaps in this moment, it is the reader who takes possession of the
letter from Dupin. Perhaps in this moment, it is for the reader that
the letter "arrives," insofar as the reader takes up the position of
the interpreter of the tale; a position from which the reader (as the
Minister and Dupin had done previously) identifies something of
himself/herself in relation to the stolen letter.
Lacan, in his Seminar on the Purloined Letter, draws particular
attention to the way in which it is the trajectory of the letter itself,
rather than the contents of the letter or the characteristics of the
characters that re-orders the lives of the characters. Lacan says that
in his seminar he is illustrating "... the truth which may be drawn
from that moment of Freud's thought under study-namely, that it
is the symbolic order which is constitutive for the subject-by
demonstrating in a story the decisive orientation which the subject
receives from the trajectory of the signifier." 33 The importance of
the letter in the story, then, is the way in which it describes the
operation of the signifier. As Barbara Johnson observes, "the letter
[in Poe's story] does not function as a unit of meaning (a signified),
but as that which produces certain effects (a signifier)... " Most
importantly, those effects are produced, both within the story and
on the reader of the story without anybody having to know what
the contents of the letter actually signify. When Lacan, at the end
of his Seminar, declares that a "letter always arrives at its
destination," he is concerned with describing the way in which the
33. Lacan, supra note 2, at 29.
34. See Barbara Johnson, The Frame of Reference: Poe, Lacan, Derrida, in
THE PURLOINED POE 217 (John Muller, J. & William Richardson, eds., 1988).
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subject is constituted by the order of meaning; the way in which the
signifier only has significance (i.e., functions as a signifier) for the
subject who encounters something of itself as the signifier's
addressee. To view the nation in these terms will be (as we will
later discuss) to view the nation in terms of its operation as a
signifier; in terms of its "function" in political and legal discourse, in
terms of its "effects," irrespective of any content it might have, and
irrespective of anything that might be signified by its operation.
This will mean seeing the nation in terms of the way in which the
subject is constituted by its address, and in terms of the nation's
trajectory in legal and political discourse.
However, Derrida's riposte to Lacan, in an essay entitled The
Purveyor of Truth must first be mentioned here. Derrida retorts
with the question: surely, at least sometimes, must the letter not
also fail to arrive?35 By posing this question, Derrida seeks to
subvert the possibility of what appears to be Lacan's attempt to
"occupy a position of analytical mastery."36 He accuses Lacan of
assuming that there "is a single proper itinerary for the letter which
returns to a determinable place"37 Furthermore, Derrida suspects
that what determines this singular trajectory is the truth that Lacan
seeks to ascribe to the content-less letter. That truth is the letter's
lack of content, lack itself: "The truth of the purloined letter is the
truth; its meaning is meaning, its law is the law, the contract of truth
itself with logos ... the truth of Being as non-being. The truth is
woman as veiled/unveiled castration."3 This "truth" (of lack) gives
the letter its place, its destination and its unity as a signifier: "The
singular unity of the letter is the site of the contract with truth itself.
This is why the letter comes back to, amounts to woman."39 In
Derrida's account, Lacan's view of the trajectory of the signifier is
one that can allow the truth of signifier (as a signifier of lack) to be
teleologically interpreted by psychoanalysis. He regards Lacan's
declaration that a letter always arrives at its destination as an
affirmation that psychoanalysis can give us a standpoint from which
it becomes possible to determine the "arrival of the letter."
Derrida lays two other accusations before Lacan, both of which
concern Lacan's reductive "use" of The Purloined Letter as an
exemplar of the operation of the signifier. The first prong of this
35. See Jacques Derrida, The Purveyor of Truth, in THE PURLOINED POE Ch. 2
(John Muller, J. & William Richardson, eds., 1988).
36. Johnson, supra note 34, at 214.
37. Derrida, supra note 35, at 182.
38. Id. at 183.
39. Id.
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accusation concerns the multiplicity of meanings inherent in the
signifier itself. He considers that Lacan has failed to take account
of the divisibility of the signifier within the text, within the
"complex structure of the scene of writing."'  Derrida is here
describing the threat of the dissemination of the signifier to disrupt
the circuit that brings the signifier "to its destination." As Derrida
observes, "not that the letter never arrives at its destination, but
that it belongs to the structure of the letter to be capable, always, of
not arriving... dissemination threatens the law of the signifier and
of castration as the contract of truth."'" Derrida's second
accusation is that Lacan has "framed" the arrival of the letter by a
selective reading of The Purloined Letter, by omitting, for example,
any discussion of the other stories in the trilogy of which The
Purloined Letter forms a part. His choice of the word "frame" is
significant here, as it has connotations not only of the visual frame,
which determines what the viewer of the picture can and cannot
see,42 but it also has connotations of a legal set-up; where the wrong
person is "framed" for the crime.
Barbara Johnson, in her reading of The Purveyor of Truth
addresses a number of Derrida's criticisms. Cannily, she observes
that Derrida is guilty of the same crime as Lacan, by his selection of
the passages in the Seminar on the Purloined Letter that best fit with
his account of Lacan's "doctrine of the truth."43 Just as Lacan has
framed Poe, she suggests that Derrida has also "filled in the blanks"
in Lacan's Seminar on the Purloined Letter by framing the seminar
as an affirmation of the truth of psychoanalytical theory; as a
method for deciphering the text; as a means of returning to the
signifier the possibility of meaning as truth. But the "truth" that
Derrida finds in the Seminar on the Purloined Letter is "the truth of
veiled/unveiled castration, and of the transcendental identity of the
phallus as the lack that makes the system work."' In fact, Lacan
never mentions castration in his seminar.45 Johnson notes (with
perhaps a hint of irony) Derrida's dismissal of Lacan's "style" as
"mere ornament, which was such that it would hinder or delay...
access to a unique content or a single unequivocal meaning
40. Id. at 179.
41. Id. at 187.
42. See JACQUES DERRIDA, THE TRUTH IN PAINTING (Geoff Bennington trans.
1978).
43. Derrida, supra note 35, at 192.
44. Johnson, supra note 34, at 225.
45. See id. at 218.
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determinable beyond the writing itself."46 These observations lead
Johnson to suggest that what Derrida is arguing against in The
Purveyor of Truth is not necessarily the text of the Purloined Letter,
but "Lacan's power," "the appearance of mastery"47 that Lacan
seems to claim by "deciphering" the trajectory of the letter.
However, the "truth" of the Purloined Letter, which Derrida
has identified as the "truth" of a psychoanalytical method that
teleologically delivers the unequivocal meaning of the signifier to
the analyst, is in fact its opposite. As Zizek notes, the Seminar on
the Purloined Letter itself "lays bare the mechanism of teleological
illusion."' Whereas Derrida has read the destination of the letter
as an empirical place, which has been predestined by the act of the
sender; for Lacan the destination is the place of the subject,
wherever it is, the place of the reader who "discovers" himself/
herself to be the letter's addressee. 9 Lacan's declaration reveals
the way in which the subject retrospectively gives content to the
signifier: i.e. "when I am confronted with the arbitrary nature of
the letter, I automatically make the assumption: the letter can only
have a particular content because it must have been pre-destined
for me alone."
Indeed, the enigmatic final words of the Seminar on the
Purloined Letter bear this out: "the sender... receives from the
receiver his own message in reverse form. Thus it is that what the
"purloined letter," nay, the "letter in sufferance" means is that a
letter always arrives at its destination., 50 This reversal of "sender"
and "receiver" illustrates that there is no "objective" position from
which the content of the letter can be deciphered." Perhaps this
reversal can be understood in terms of the "return of the
repressed," a return which only "has" meaning for its addressee,
but which is never the meaning that we expect it to be. It is not that
these two positions (of sender and receiver) are symmetrical, but on
the contrary, the reversal of the letter indicates that the "sender" of
the letter (insofar as the letter can be said to have a sender) is the
big Other: the order of meaning: exteriority itself. Zizek gives an
46. Id. at 219.
47. Id. at 227.
48. See ZIZEK, supra note 6, at 10.
49. See Johnson, supra note 34. Johnson says that the "letter's destination
is ... wherever it is read: the place it assigns to the reader as his own partiality."
Id. at 248
50. Lacan, supra note 2, at 53.
51. See Johnson, supra note 34. Johnson uses this example to illustrate the
"discovery" that is made in psychoanalysis: "that the analyst is involved through
transference in the very 'object' of his analysis." Id. at 247.
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example in this context of the letter which is sent without an
addressee (the message in a bottle that is dropped into the sea after
a shipwreck) as the clearest illustration of the "letter which always
arrives at its destination": This because it is delivery of the letter
into the field of the Other; the very act of sending the letter that
constitutes its destination."
IV. How the Nation "Always Arrives!"
The use of the "purloined letter" as an analogy for operation
of the nation has a number of consequences that now need to be
explored. The first is that the nation, if it is to be conceived of as a
signifier, cannot be understood in terms of any putative content the
nation might have (or, indeed, might fail to have). Instead, it
requires that the nation be understood in terms of the way in which
its movement from one discursive position to the next re-orders
political subjectivity. One might generally describe, for example,
the way in which the Belfast Agreement has the effect of moving
(purloining) the dominant conception of the nation from
aspirational constitutional discourse (which makes a direct appeal
to national origins) to the "neutral" discourse of legal admin-
istration, from which the question of national origins appears to
have been suspended. Furthermore, if we are to avoid a conception
of the nation that presupposes that the nation has a signified, or has
"content," then we must examine the way in which the nation
operates as a point of political identification in relation to legal
discourse. In particular, we need to describe the ideological
operation of the nation in terms of the letter, which only becomes a
letter when I discover that it has been addressed to me; a letter that
always "arrives" at its destination, because its destination, to quote
Zizek, "is wherever it arrives!"53
It is in this context that the administrative institutions
established by the Belfast Agreement become particularly
interesting, because it is in relation to the subject's identification of
itself as the addressee of these institutions that the nation (often
52. See ZIZEK, supra note 6. Zizek observes:
its true addressee is not the empirical other which may receive it or not,
but the big Other, the symbolic order itself, which receives it the moment
the letter is put into circulation, i.e., the moment the sender 'externalises'
his message, delivers it to the Other, the moment the Other takes
cognisance of the letter and thus disburdens the sender of responsibility
for it.
Id. at 10.
53. Id. at 10.
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unexpectedly) "arrives." In particular, it is worth exploring the way
in which these "neutral" institutions become invested with
"national" significance for the subject. These institutions have to
play a double role. On the one hand, they have to be sufficiently
"neutral" to ensure that both Irish nationalists and Ulster unionists
can sustain a public commitment to a citizenship based on abstract
rights and duties. On the other hand, the institutions of the
agreement must also have sufficient appeal for both nationalist and
unionist aspirations to enable each of the communities to regard the
institutions as particularly "theirs." On one level, it is the absence
of the nation as a point of origins that guarantees the effectiveness
of the Belfast Agreement. Alternatively, what gives the Belfast
Agreement its political currency is the extent to which it allows
contradictory national claims to be invoked indirectly in a legal
form; the extent to which the Agreement can be seen by
nationalists and unionists to "belong to" each of them separately
and to the exclusion of each other. In this sense, the nation has not
been excised from political life, because it is the nation that makes
the "civic" legal identity envisaged by the Belfast Agreement
"stick." It is in this identification of the Belfast Agreement as
belonging to "us" and not to "them" that the nation (which ever
nation it is) "arrives at its destination.''
The way in which the letter's destination is not an empirical
location, but "whoever is possessed by it"55 illustrates the way in
which the signifier orders the position of the subject independent of
any content it is supposed to signify. For Zizek, this is also a
description of the "the logic by which one (mis)recognises oneself
as the addressee of ideological interpellation."56 By this, Zizek is
describing the way in which ideological discourse "arrives at its
destination" in the subject by constructing the subject as its
addressee: It's not that I can "objectively" recognise myself as the
54. It is interesting to note here the way in which the nation operates as a
"floating signifier." This concept, derived from the Lacan's notion of the point de
caption describes the way in which certain signifiers can be understood as key
points in the discursive framework, which have the effect of partially and
temporarily fixing the meaning of the signifying chain (although these points
themselves also shift within that chain of signification). The nation can be seen to
operate as a floating signifier to the extent that it can be seen as integral to both
the discourse of national origins and the discourse of administration. See JACQUES
LACAN, ECRITS, A SELECTION (1993). See also BRUCE FINK, THE LACANIAN
SUBJECT 14-24 (1995); and ERNESTO LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY
AND SOCIALIST STRATEGY 111-14 (1985).
55. Johnson, supra note 34, at 248.
56. See ZIZEK, supra note 6, at 10.
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addressee of ideological discourse; I can't, because the ideological
discourse is what produces me its addressee. In this way, the
contingency of ideological identification becomes transformed into
the outcome of fate: the letter, the nation, etc., must have been
destined for me: why else would I identify with it? This
identification, the lifeblood of political discourse, conceals its own
performativity: it conceals the way in which I presuppose that I
must have been the addressee of ideological discourse as soon as I
find something of myself in it.1
7
This "trick" of ideology also describes the way in which the
Belfast Agreement has effectively re-ordered the intersubjective
network. The "trick" of the Belfast Agreement is that it is though
its "neutral" legal institutions that the subject is constituted as the
addressee of the nation! The subject can see itself as the addressee
of "neutral" legal discourse, but it is the indirect address of the
nation that makes the legal discourse of the Belfast agreement
"stick." Here is the paradox of the post-nationalist thesis: That in
order for the post-nationalist "civic" legal order to re-order political
identification, it must appeal to us, the legal subjects, as if it is "our"
legal order; it must "speak" to us as subjects. In the context of the
Belfast Agreement, this post-nationalist legal identity becomes
"ours" to the extent that it has been "grounded" or authorised for
the subject as the embodiment of the nation. In this identification,
the nation is retroactively installed, or presupposed as law's origin.
What is concealed in the identification of this legal discourse as
"speaking to us" in particular is the performative force of this
presupposition of origins. Instead, it appears "natural" or "fateful"
that the legal discourse of the Belfast Agreement should "belong
to" us. After all, why else would we have identified with it?
However, what this identification of legal discourse as "our
law" cannot see is that the particular nation that has "pre-destined"
law to become recognised as "ours" has no content in itself. This is
to say that the "fateful" (mis)recognition by the subject of itself as
the addressee of legal discourse can be understood as a position to
be occupied by the subject; a position which is produced by the
trajectory of the nation as a signifier in relation to political
discourse. This (mis)recognition echoes the way in which the
characters in The Purloined Letter "automatically perceive their
57. See id. Zizek says "[this] is the reason why a letter always reaches its
addressee: because one becomes its addressee when one is reached. The
Derridean reproach that a letter can also miss its addressee is simply beside the
point: it makes sense only insofar as I presuppose that I can be its addressee." Id.
at 12.
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fate as something that pertains to the letter as such,"58 as if the
effects produced by its repeated theft are due to some mysterious
quality of the letter itself, rather than to the intersubjective network
in which the letter operates. Understanding the ideological
operation of the Belfast Agreement is not so much a question of
which nation it is that the Agreement embodies (or fails to
embody), but of how the "arrival" of the nation for the legal subject
is what retroactively constitutes the legal authority of the Belfast
Agreement.
V. How the Nation "Returns" in Legal Discourse
An interesting case study of political identification under the
aegis of the Belfast Agreement can be made of the dispute about
which flag should fly over the new legal institutions of Northern
Ireland, a detail of the new administration that was curiously
omitted from the Belfast Agreement. However, this dispute over
symbols had demonstrated a capacity on a number of occasions to
considerably undermine the Assembly and other legal institutions.
This matter has considerable historical resonance particularly due
to the inflammatory effect of the infamous Stormont-era legislation
which had made it an offence to display the Irish tricolour in public;
an act whose implementation had been associated with some of the
earliest violence of the current troubles. 9 In October 2000, after
the Northern Ireland Assembly had failed to reach agreement on
the issue, a cross-community ad hoc committee on flags was
convened by the Assembly to resolve the matter.6° When this
committee also failed to reach agreement, the Northern Ireland
Secretary, Peter Mandelson, intervened, issuing an order decreeing
that on seventeen designated days, the majority of which are
associated with the royal family, the Union flag alone was to be
flown over ministerial buildings in Northern Ireland. 6' Nationalist
parties objected to this order, not only because the Secretary of
State had supervened the institutions of the Belfast Agreement, but
because his action had interfered with the principle of "Parity of
58. Id. at 16.
59. The Flags and Emblems Act 1954 (NI) (repealed 1987) made it an offence
to interfere with the union flag and to display "any provocative item" including the
Irish tricolour. See TIM PAT COOGAN, THE TROUBLES 47-49 (1995) (for a
discussion of the police violence and rioting that was associated with attempts to
enforce this legislation in 1964).
60. Ad Hoc Committee on Flags (NI) Order 2000.
61. The Flags (2000 Order) (Commencement) Order (Northern Ireland) 2000
(UK).
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Esteem" that is laid down as one of the guiding principles of the
Belfast Agreement.62 They argued that under the principle of parity
of esteem, either a combination of the union flag and the tricolour
should be flown, or else no flag at all. All unionist parties, by
contrast, argued in favour of the order, on the grounds that "the
constitutional status of Northern Ireland is unambiguously stated
[in the Belfast Agreement] as being 'in its entirety' a part of the
United Kingdom. The flying of the Union flag from government
buildings is the clear expression of that constitutional position."'63
In October 2001, a nationalist party (Sinn F6in) lost a high court
challenge to the order by the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland.
Bryson and McCartney have argued that the dispute over flags
betrays a significant difference between nationalist and unionist
attitudes to national flags, suggesting that for Irish nationalists the
flag is primarily an expression of Irish identity, whereas for Ulster
unionists it is a symbol of political loyalty to the United Kingdom. 
6
Robin Wilson however, suggests that the unionist position does not
recognise the political changes that have been produced by the
Belfast Agreement. In particular, he argues that the devolved
institutions are concerned with citizenship rather than subjecthood,
and that the choice of flag should reflect "civic rather than ethnic
concerns." His proposal, which echoes Kearney's post-nationalist
thesis, is that a new neutral flag should be designed to fly over
official buildings (along with the flag of the EU), while both the
tricolour and the union flag could be flown as a supplement to
represent "no more than two of the contexts in which Northern
Ireland as a region finds itself.,
65
This dispute is interesting as a return of the "national
question" in the context of the institutions of the Belfast
Agreement. The dispute erupts as a seemingly irresoluble point of
62. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, § 2.1(v) (Constitutional Issues).
63. Submission by the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) to the Ad Hoc Committee
to consider the draft Regulations laid by the Secretary of State under the Flags
(Northern Ireland) Order 2000.
64. See LucY BRYSON & CLEM MCCARTNEY, CLASHING SYMBOLS: A REPORT
ON THE USE OF FLAGS, ANTHEMS AND OTHER NATIONAL SYMBOLS IN NORTHERN
IRELAND (1994); and Henry Patterson, Party versus Order: Ulster Unionism and
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departure between unionist and nationalist positions. The corollary
of Robin Wilson's observations is that the dispute about flags is an
instance of both unionists and nationalists attempting to "claim"
the institutions of the Belfast Agreement; to symbolically foreclose
the question of sovereignty that the Agreement has left open; to
retrospectively install the origin! However, what is interesting for
our purposes is that the "national" dispute erupts for and within
legal institutions: the Assembly, the Ad Hoc Committee and the
Courts. Significantly, it is a dispute that is structured in legal and
institutional terms, which implicitly assume the legitimacy of the
legal institutions of the Agreement. While the dispute appears to
be an example of the failure of the "civic" legal identity espoused in
the Belfast Agreement, in fact it can be seen as the opposite: it is
an example of the (excessive) success with which the "civic" or
"neutral" administrative discourse of the Agreement has become
invested with national identification. It is surely in such political
struggle for the definition of the administrative institutions of the
Agreement that the nation "arrives." Indeed, one could further
argue that this identification by both unionists and nationalists with
the institutions of the Agreement with the nation is on the contrary
an instance of the "healthy" operation of civic institutions and is
indicative of the extent to which the Belfast Agreement has
reconfigured national identification. The profundity of such a shift
in political identification should not be understated, particularly in
a context where legal institutions were rejected until recently by
many nationalists merely as institutions of colonial domination. 6
However, the way in which the "emptiness" of the legal
discourse of the Belfast Agreement becomes "filled" with national
identification in this matter can also be seen in terms of the closing
words of Lacan's Seminar on the Purloined Letter: "the sender...
receives from the receiver his own message in reverse form....
The message that the subject receives "in reverse form" from its
self-identification in the "neutral" legal discourse of the Belfast
Agreement is that very thing that the neutral legal discourse has
appeared to repress: the impossible and exclusionary demand for
66. By contrast, the decision of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to
exercise his own executive powers to decide the matter indicates a troubling lack
of investment in the institutions of the Agreement. This is particularly because his
actions threatened to foreclose the question of origins in the Belfast Agreement:
the open question of the nation to which the legal institutions "belong."
Additionally, the externality of the Secretary of State's position to the symbolic
economy of the Agreement is revealed by his action, and in this sense, his
sovereign position is revealed.
67. Lacan, supra note 2, at 53.
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the actualization of the nation! What has been repressed from the
"neutral" administrative discourse of the Belfast Agreement is the
nation as a source of legal origins. By the same token, it is the
nation that "returns" in its true, inverted form in the subject's
identification with "neutral" legal discourse. What "returns" in the
dispute over flags is the demand to foreclose the question of
national origins, the very thing that will render impossible the
"neutral" administrative discourse of the Belfast Agreement. To
paraphrase Zizek, the administrative discourse of the Belfast
Agreement corresponds to the "superego's 'malevolent neutrality';
[it] is nothing but a neutral 'purveyor of truth' but giving us only
what we wanted, but including in the package part of what we
wanted to ignore."
This "return of the repressed" (by which the "letter arrives at
its destination") can be seen in the way in which the "neutral"
administrative discourse of the Belfast Agreement becomes its
opposite as soon as it is invested with national identification. In the
political discourse of pro-Agreement unionism, for example, the
"neutral" institutions of the Belfast Agreement are often presented
as institutions that will finally remove from the political scene the
threat of nationalist "subversion" of unionist rule. This view would
suggest that in exchange for the consultative role that the Dublin
government is given in the Agreement, Catholics will eventually
accept the inevitable destiny of Northern Ireland as part of the
United Kingdom and republicans Will surrender their weapons.
The Agreement thus becomes justified in pro-Agreement unionist
political discourse as a means of "tricking" nationalists accepting a
unionist veto on constitutional change and of humiliating
supporters of the IRA. What is interesting is the way in which the
"neutral" administrative discourse of the Belfast Agreement
becomes incorporated into unionist thinking as its opposite: as a
means of guaranteeing the exclusion of Catholics from political
power.6' In pro-Agreement Irish nationalist discourse, a similar
logic is at play. Pro-Agreement nationalists often point to two
"inevitabilities" that will result from the Agreement: the inevitable
blurring of the North-South border that will be brought about by
the institutions of the Belfast Agreement (particularly the North-
South Ministerial Council, the British-Irish Council and the British-
Irish Intergovernmental Conference) along with the inevitable
demographic change that will bring about a Catholic majority in
68. See generally PROTESTANT PERCEPTIONS OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN
NORTHERN IRELAND (Dominic Muray ed., 2000).
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Northern Ireland. These "inevitabilities" allows the Belfast
Agreement to be incorporated into nationalist discourse as a stage
of the "inevitable" unification of the country.69 Again, the
"neutral" and "transitional" discourse of administration becomes
its opposite: it becomes part of an exclusionary demographic
discourse by which the eventual "true" political embodiment of the
Irish nation appears guaranteed.
VI. Conclusion
In this article, the nation has been treated in terms of its
ideological operation, in terms of its functioning as a signifier,
rather than in terms of content. This has meant examining the way
in which the subject is constituted by the ideological address of the
nation in the way that the subject identifies something of himself or
herself in legal discourse; the way in which the subject embodies
legal discourse with the authority of the nation; the moment when
the subject sees legal discourse as something that "must have been
destined for him or her!" Just as the minister in The Purloined
Letter comes to occupy the position previously occupied by the
queen in a way that appears inevitable or predestined, this self-
identification by the legal subject is also a profoundly "fateful"
moment. It is a moment in which the identification of legal
discourse as having been "meant for us alone" has the appearance
of inevitability, as an instance of what Zizek describes as a
"symbolic debt that has to be repaid."70 In terms of the operation of
the nation as an origin that is retrospectively installed in legal
discourse, this takes the form of identifying with the "neutral"
administrative discourse of the Belfast Agreement as the
embodiment of its opposite; the nation as a foundation of authority.
I What this article has sought to do is to accept the impossibility
of "locating" the nation as the origin in legal discourse, but also to
go beyond merely revealing the impossibility of national origins.
This suggests that the nation does more than merely fail to be
embodied as an origin for legal discourse. Instead, the emphasis in
this paper is on identification, on the way in which the movement of
the nation from one discursive position to another re-orders
political identification. This perspective allows for a re-concep-
tualization of the way in which the nation operates as a signifier,
69. See Peter Shirlow & Paul Stewart, Northern Ireland Between Peace and
War, 69 CAPITAL & CLASS. IV (Autumn, 1999). See generally, FIONNUALA
O'CONNOR, IN SEARCH OF A STATE, CATHOLICS IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1993).
70. ZIZEK, supra note 6, at 16.
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irrespective of what it may signify or fail to signify. It allows for an
analysis of the ideological operation of the nation in relation to
legal discourse in terms of the way in which the cognitive gap in
legal discourse becomes "filled" by the nation: in terms of the way
in which the nation becomes retroactively installed for the subject
as an authorization of legal discourse. In the context of the Belfast
Agreement, it denies the possibility of the Agreement instituting a
"pure" administrative discourse from which the nation as an origin
has been suspended, because it is in this administrative discourse
itself that the subject encounters something of itself as the
addressee of the nation: it is in the subject's self-identification in
''neutral" administrative discourse of the Belfast agreement that the
nation always "arrives" at its destination.

